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Abstract
The real eﬀects of an imperfectly credible disinﬂation depend critically on the extent
of price rigidity. Therefore, the study of how policymakers’ credibility aﬀects the
outcome of an announced disinﬂation should not be dissociated from the analysis of
the determinants of the frequency of price adjustments. In this paper we examine
how credibility aﬀects the outcome of a disinﬂation in a model with endogenous time-
dependent pricing rules. Both the initial degree of price ridigity, calculated optimally,
and, more notably, the changes in the duration of price spells during disinﬂation play
an important role in the explanation of the eﬀects of imperfect credibility. We initially
consider the costs of disinﬂation when the degree of credibility is ﬁxed, and then allow
agents to use Bayes rule to update beliefs about the “type” of monetary authority that
they face. In both cases, the interaction between the endogeneity of time-dependent
rules and imperfect credibility increases the output costs of disinﬂation. The pattern
of the output response is more realistic in the case with learning.
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11 Introduction
Lack of credibility has, for a long time, been pointed out as an important ingredient in
explaining real eﬀects of disinﬂation (e.g. Sargent, 1983). It arises when a monetary authority
that is serious about disinﬂating faces distrust from the private sector. Yet, price rigidity
is necessary for an imperfectly credible disinﬂation to have meaningful real eﬀects. If prices
are fully ﬂexible, monetary policy essentially has no real eﬀects, and the lack of credibility
does not matter.1
Additionally, the extent of price rigidity matters for the eﬀect of imperfect credibility.
Consider an economy during an imperfectly credible disinﬂation in which individual prices
are ﬁxed for extremely short periods of time. Then, the price optimally set by each ﬁrm
tends to be very similar to the price that would be set under full credibility, since there is
relatively little uncertainty about the monetary policy regime in the very short run. The real
eﬀects of imperfect credibility in this case are not very important. However, the same is not
true of an economy where prices are ﬁxed for long periods of time. Since policy uncertainty
tends to build up with time, in that case there is a much higher probability of a policy
reversal between price adjustments. This uncertainty aﬀects pricing decisions, leading to
substantial diﬀerences between the individual prices set during an imperfectly credible and
a perfectly credible disinﬂation.2
Because the role of credibility depends on the frequency of price changes, conclusions
about the eﬀect of imperfect credibility that are based on models where this frequency is
chosen arbitrarily will reﬂect this arbitrary choice. In addition, since a disinﬂation typically
involves a policy regime change, analyses based on such models are inherently subject to the
Lucas critique. Not only should the degree of price rigidity respond to the change in regime,
it should also depend on its credibility. For those reasons, the study of the role of credibility
in disinﬂation episodes should not be dissociated from the analysis of the determinants of
the frequency of price changes.
In this paper we analyze how a policymaker’s credibility aﬀects the outcome of a disin-
ﬂation in a model in which the extent of price rigidity is endogenous. In our model ﬁrms
face frictions that make it optimal to choose ex-ante the time of the next price change. As a
result, the time period between price adjustments - the duration of the spells of price rigidity
1In standard models with a unique equilibrium. With multiple equilibria, credibility, as sunspots, may
move the economy from one equilibrium to another.
2This applies to models where not all ﬁrms have the option to react instantaneously and with full
information to an eventual policy reversal. It applies both to time-dependent models with nominal rigidity,
as in Taylor (1979, 1980) and Calvo (1983), and sticky information models, as in Mankiw and Reis (2002),
and Reis (2006). It does not apply to state-dependent pricing models, as in Caplin and Spulber (1987),
where information is continuously available.
2- responds to changes in the economic environment.
Credibility aﬀects the costs of disinﬂation through a direct and an indirect eﬀect on prices.
The direct eﬀect is through the expectation of the path of marginal costs until the time of
the next price change, given the frequency of price changes. It appears in models based
on exogenous time-dependent pricing rules (e.g. Ball 1995, and Erceg and Levin 2003).
As we argued above, the magnitude of this eﬀect hinges on the duration of price spells.
Our framework naturally brings discipline to the analysis, since such spells are determined
endogenously.3 The indirect eﬀect arises in our model with endogenous pricing rules because
changes in the frequency of price changes during the disinﬂation also aﬀect the individual
prices chosen. With policy regime shifts, as it happens with a new disinﬂationary policy,
this eﬀect becomes important.
In Section 2 we derive the optimal pricing rule under the assumption that ﬁrms cannot
obtain, process and react to new information nor adjust prices based on their old information
unless they incur a real lump sum cost, as in Bonomo and Carvalho (2004). We provide more
explicit foundations to our earlier approach, and extend it to derive the optimal pricing rule
during an imperfectly credible disinﬂation. The resulting pricing strategy is an endogenous
time-dependent rule, where each time a ﬁrm incurs the information/adjustment cost, it sets
a price and chooses ex-ante when next to gather and process information to decide on a new
price. We refer to such chosen times as pricing dates.4
We view the assumption of a single information/adjustment cost as a tractable way to
incorporate information frictions and adjustment costs that appear to be present in price
setting decisions, as documented by Zbaracki et al. (2004). The resulting pricing rule
displays time-dependency that resembles the “pricing seasons” described by those authors,
and nominal rigidities that are consistent with microeconomic evidence on individual prices
(e.g. Bils and Klenow 2004 for recent evidence for the U.S. economy).
Our endogenous time-dependent pricing rule has important implications for the litera-
ture that aims to discriminate empirically between alternative models of price setting (e.g.
3One could argue that the arbitrariness in specifying (exogenously) the duration of price spells could be
avoided by calibrating the frequency of price changes to the microeconomic evidence. However, this would
restrict the scope of analysis to economic environments similar to the ones that produced the evidence used
in the calibration. In contrast, our approach allows us to calibrate the primitive parameters of the model to
the available evidence, and compute the frequency of price changes for diﬀerent economic environments.
4A pure adjustment cost (“menu cost”) would give rise to state-dependent pricing (e.g. Barro 1972,
Sheshinski and Weiss 1977), whereas a pure information cost would lead to the choice of price paths in between
optimally chosen information-gathering dates, as in Caballero (1989) and Reis (2006). Ball, Mankiw, and
Romer (1988) analyze a model with endogenous contract lengths in inﬂationary steady states as a tractable
approximation to state-dependent pricing. In a related paper, Romer (1990) proposes an optimally chosen
frequency of price adjustment in a Calvo-type model as a tractable (albeit suboptimal) alternative to state-
dependent policies. For a recent application of Romer’s model, see Levin and Yun (2007).
3Klenow and Kryvtsov 2008). In our model, the frequency of price changes responds to the
economic environment in ways that resemble a state-dependent pricing model. In particular,
it increases with inﬂation, in line with both time-series and cross-country evidence.5 Thus,
such empirical evidence cannot be used to distinguish between state- and time-dependent
pricing behavior. This necessarily requires exploring alternative implications of these models.
Our main interest is to analyze the mechanism through which an imperfectly credible
disinﬂation aﬀects output in a setting in which price setting decisions are optimal. We take
credibility as exogenous, and model imperfect credibility as a discrepancy between private
agents’ beliefs about the likelihood that the monetary authority abandons the disinﬂation,
and the objective likelihood. Such beliefs aﬀect aggregate outcomes through their eﬀect
on the choice of the time interval between pricing dates, and prices set by ﬁrms.6 For
tractability, we model disinﬂation as a policy shift that changes the growth rate of nominal
aggregate demand instantaneously, without making explicit the details of the transmission
mechanism.7
In Section 3 we examine the case where the degree of credibility is ﬁxed, so that price
setters’ beliefs do not change, despite the fact that the disinﬂation policy is never aban-
doned. For a given frequency of price changes, imperfect credibility increases the costs of
disinﬂation because agents believe that there is some probability that the stabilization will
be abandoned before their next pricing date, and therefore set prices higher than in the case
of full credibility. To properly measure this direct eﬀect, we set the exogenous frequency of
price changes equal to the one that would be optimal for the inﬂationary environment that
prevailed prior to the disinﬂation.
We assess the indirect eﬀect of credibility by examining the case in which pricing rules are
endogenous. We ﬁnd the costs of disinﬂation to be higher in this case. With endogenous rules,
when faced with lower expected inﬂation after the disinﬂation is launched, ﬁrms optimally
choose to change prices less frequently. This raises the probability of a policy reversal
occurring between pricing dates, amplifying the diﬀerence between individual prices set under
perfect and imperfect credibility.
In Section 4 we introduce learning. The assumption that agents do not update their
5See, for instance, Dhyne et al. (2006), Gagnon (2007), Konieczny and Skrzypacz (2005), Lach and
Tsiddon (1992), and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008).
6T h e r ei sa n o t h e rl i n eo fi n v e s t i g a t i o na b o u tt h ee ﬀects of imperfect credibility on disinﬂation, which
focuses on explaining credibility. Those models usually have a simple aggregate supply structure, and rely on
the discretionary nature of monetary policy. Recent examples are Siu (2008) and Westelius (2005). Backus
and Driﬃll (1985a,b) provided earlier contributions.
7For other purposes it might be worthwhile to embed our endogenous time-dependent pricing rule in a
model with an explicit transmission mechanism, and study the eﬀects of disinﬂa t i o nw h e ni ti si m p l e m e n t e d
in alternative ways (e.g. lowering an inﬂation target, adopting a currency peg etc).
4beliefs, despite useful for gaining insight, is not realistic. It generates the unappealing result
that after disinﬂation output remains permanently below potential. One should expect
the monetary authority to gain credibility through time, as agents observe that disinﬂation
continues and update their beliefs about its resolve to deliver on the promise to disinﬂate.
We model the evolution of agents’ beliefs through Bayesian learning. The result is a more
realistic output path in which the monetary authority gains credibility, and the recession is
gradually eliminated. Moreover, the main result of the paper, that endogeneity of pricing
rules and lack of credibility interact to generate higher disinﬂation costs, continues to hold.
The literature that links imperfect credibility and price rigidity explicitly starts with Ball
(1995), who argues that both ingredients are necessary to explain the costs of disinﬂation.
He focuses on average eﬀects of disinﬂation when agents’ beliefs are in fact correct (i.e.
they know the distribution of abandonment times). Erceg and Levin (2003) explain the
output costs during the Volcker disinﬂation with a model where agents have to learn about
a structural change in the interest rate rule. Both papers use exogenous pricing rules.
Nicolae and Nolan (2006) model a credibility problem similar to ours, but assume simple
learning schemes instead of Bayesian updating. Moreover, they limit the choice of pricing
rules: prices are adjusted either every period or every other period. Finally, Almeida and
Bonomo (2002) analyze the output costs of disinﬂation under imperfect credibility and state-
dependent pricing. In that model, price setters observe monetary policy and reconsider their
pricing decisions continuously, under full information. As a result, imperfect credibility has
only a small eﬀect through its impact on the optimal pricing rule.
2 The model
We start from a model with a representative consumer who derives utility from a Dixit-
Stiglitz composite of diﬀerent varieties of a consumption good. She incurs disutility from
supplying labor in a competitive market to a continuum of monopolistically competitive
ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm hires labor to produce its variety of the consumption good using a technology
that is subject to productivity shocks. Firms face frictions that make it optimal to undertake
pricing decisions infrequently, as we discuss extensively in the next subsection. As is now
common in the literature, we assume a cashless economy (e.g. Woodford 2003).
In Appendix A we develop the model from fundamentals, and derive the following loglin-





it = Yt − y
n
t + eit, (1)
where Yt is nominal aggregate demand, yn
t is the natural output rate, and the eit’s are
mutually independent, zero mean ﬁrm-speciﬁcs h o c k s .
In a ﬂexible price equilibrium, i.e. if none of the ﬁrms faced pricing frictions, the price
charged by ﬁrm i at time t, p
f
it, would in eﬀect evolve according to (1). Then, the aggregate
price in such equilibrium, p
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t + eit, respectively. In contrast, in our economy output will deviate from yn
t due to the
f r i c t i o n st h a tm a k ei n f r e q u e n tp r i cing decisions optimal. Letting pt denote the price level
that results from aggregation of the actual prices charged by individual ﬁrms, output (yt)
will be given by:









For simplicity, in the subsequent sections we abstract from aggregate shocks that would
aﬀect the natural rate of output. Thus, any variation in the level of output in our economy
is a result of the pricing frictions to which we turn in the next subsection.
2.1 Optimal time-dependent pricing rule
The microeconomic evidence on nominal price rigidity has usually been rationalized by the
existence of menu costs of changing prices. As it is well known, this leads to pricing decisions
that are state-dependent. However, available evidence based on interview studies (Blinder
et al. 1998) and direct measurement through ﬁeld work (Zbaracki et al. 2004) shows the
importance of other types of costs associated with price setting decisions, such as information
gathering, decision making, and internal communication costs. Those costs prevent the
continuous information gathering and processing that are necessary for the implementation
of purely state-dependent pricing strategies.
Non-convex information and decision making costs lead to infrequent pricing decisions,
and time-dependency (Reis 2006). However, in the absence of adjustment costs, the optimal
8Throughout the paper, lowercase variables denote log-deviations of the respective quantity from the
deterministic steady-state, as detailed in Appendix A. For expositional simplicity, we omit the expression
“log-deviation from the steady state”, refering directly to the names of the corresponding variables.
9This follows from a loglinear approximation to the aggregate price index (see Appendix A).
6pricing rule calls for the choice of a price path at each decision date. This implication is at
odds with the microeconomic evidence on nominal price rigidity.
A model endowed with both information and adjustment costs should capture the time-
dependency uncovered in recent work (e.g. the pricing seasons documented in Zbaracki et al.
2004) and at the same time generate nominal price rigidity.10 A tractable model with these
features is analyzed by Bonomo and Carvalho (2004), who assume that ﬁrms cannot obtain,
process and react to new information nor adjust prices based on their old information unless
they incur a lump sum cost. Here we provide better foundations for our earlier approach,
and extend it to obtain the optimal pricing rule under an imperfectly credible disinﬂation.
Every time a ﬁrm decides to gather and process information and/or adjust its price it
incurs a real ﬁxed cost, which we refer to as the pricing cost. Therefore, information collection
and processing, and price adjustments are undertaken infrequently, and the optimal pricing
policy amounts to choosing a sequence of pricing dates. At each such date the ﬁrm decides
on the next pricing date and sets a price that will be ﬁxed until then.11 The choice of the
optimal time interval between pricing dates weights the beneﬁts of updating information and
changing prices frequently against the pricing cost.
In Appendix B we formulate this problem from ﬁrst principles and show that under






























where V is the present value of proﬁt losses due to existence of pricing costs, F is the
(normalized) pricing cost as a share of steady state proﬁts, τi denotes the time until the
next pricing date, and zit ≡ xit − p∗
it denotes the discrepancy between the price set at t,
xit, and its frictionless optimal level p∗







¢¢2 is proportional -
to a second order approximation - to the ﬂow of proﬁts foregone due to price rigidity. The
relevant state of the economy is denoted by si
t,w i t hjth component si
jt, and its law of motion







,w h e r eηi
t,t+∆t is the set of innovations that hit ﬁrm i
and the economy between t and t + ∆t. The state of the economy matters for ﬂow values
through its eﬀect on the distribution of future frictionless optimal prices before the next
10Models that combine information and adjustment costs tend to be complex. Woodford (2008) analyzes
a model with menu costs and informational frictions in the form of costly information processing, in the
spirit of Sims (2003).
11This behavior is consistent with the evidence in Zbaracki et al. (2004). One should note that in this
setting any new information that becomes available to the ﬁrm is not taken into account until the next
pricing date. This is also a feature of the inattention model of Reis (2006). In contrast, when inattention
arises due to information processing constraints in the spirit of Sims (2003), as in Woodford’s (2008) model,
ﬁrms continuously incur costs to receive partial information.
7pricing date (p∗
it+r,f o r0 <r<τ) conditional on the information available at time t.


































































































Equations (2), (3), and (4) together with the envelope conditions fully characterize the
optimal pricing rule, as long as the second order conditions are satisﬁed. Equation (3) gives
the optimal discrepancy. It should be set equal to a weighted average of expected increments
in the frictionless optimal price until the next pricing date. Equation (4) characterizes the
optimal time interval until the next pricing date. It states that the expected marginal proﬁt
loss from postponing the next pricing decision (left hand side) should be equal to the expected
marginal beneﬁt of doing so (right hand side).
2.2 Inﬂationary steady state
In analyzing disinﬂation we start from an inﬂationary steady state characterized by a con-
stant rate of inﬂation. Let π be the constant growth rate of nominal aggregate demand. If
we diﬀerentiate equation (1), and use the assumption of constant natural output rate, and




it = πdt+ deit. (5)
Realistically we think of the idiosyncratic shocks ei as following persistent, but stationary
processes. However, modeling them as mean-reverting processes would add a state variable
to the ﬁrm’s problem without changing the main insights regarding aggregate dynamics.
Thus, we adopt the Brownian motion as a convenient approximation of short run dynamics,
12Note that, in contrast with the deterministic steady state, the inﬂationary steady state features ﬁrm-
speciﬁcs h o c k s .
8that is:
deit = σdf Wit,
where f Wit’s are mutually independent, standard Brownian motions.







at t is normal with mean z−πr and variance σ2r. It depends only on the time elapsed since
time t, and is the same for all ﬁrms. As a result, the dynamic problem (2) in the inﬂationary
steady state can be parameterized by π and written as:














−ρτ (F + Vπ)
¸
, (6)
where Vπ represents the (constant) value function for the steady state problem with nominal
aggregate demand growth rate equal to π.I nt h ei n ﬂationary steady state, the value function
and the optimal z and τ are the same for all ﬁrms, because they depend on the parameters
of the stochastic process for p∗
i and not on its realizations.



























¢¤2 − ρ(Vπ + F)=0 . (8)










































Based on the above pair of equations, one can show that the optimal time interval between
pricing dates is decreasing in |π| and σ, and increasing in F. In addition, higher idiosyncratic
uncertainty makes such time interval less sensitive to inﬂation (Bonomo and Carvalho 2004).
In our simulations, we set σ =3 %and calibrate F so that with π =3 % , σ =3 %and
ρ =2 .5% ay e a r ,ﬁrms make pricing decisions once a year. As a result we set F =0 .000595.
This frequency of price changes seems to be a reasonable characterization of price setting
behavior in low inﬂation environments. It is consistent with the ﬁndings of Dhyne et al.
(2006) for the Euro area, and with earlier evidence for the U.S. economy (e.g. Carlton, 1986
9and Blinder et al., 1998), although it is lower than the frequency of price changes reported
by Bils and Klenow (2004) for the U.S. economy.
In order to check the robustness of our calibration, we also compute the optimal time
between pricing dates for high and very high inﬂation rates. The model performs well when
confronted with the Israeli experience reported by Lach and Tsiddon (1992), and it also ﬁts
the Brazilian hyperinﬂation experience of the 80’s (Ferreira, 1994). With inﬂation rates of
77% per year the model predicts spells of price rigidity of 2.6 months, against 2.2 months
reported by Lach and Tsiddon (1992). With annual inﬂation of 210% the spells implied by
the model go down to 1.68 months, against 1.38 months reported by Ferreira (1994). Thus,
in accounting for the eﬀects of inﬂation on the frequency of price changes the performance
of our endogenous time-dependent model is comparable to that of the menu cost model
analyzed by Golosov and Lucas (2007).
Endogenous time-dependent pricing rules have important implications for the literature
that aims to discriminate between alternative models of price setting based on micro data
(e.g. Klenow and Kryvtsov 2008). In particular, the empirical ﬁnding that the frequency of
price changes responds to the economic environment cannot be taken as evidence in favor of
purely state-dependent pricing behavior.13 Thus, making progress in this area will require
exploring alternative implications of these models based on which they can be distinguished.
2.3 Optimal pricing rule under imperfectly credible disinﬂation
In this subsection we derive the optimal pricing rule during disinﬂation. The dynamic
program formulated in (2) encompasses imperfect credibility in general, which enters the
problem through the expectations operator. It is more realistic to assume that agents believe
that the new disinﬂation policy will be abandoned with some (non-zero) probability, than
to assume full credibility. We model imperfect credibility by positing that in each ﬁnite
time interval agents attribute a constant probability of a policy reversal. Thus, from the
agents’ perspective, the growth rate of nominal aggregate demand after the new policy is
implemented changes with the ﬁrst arrival of a Poisson process with constant rate h.I nc a s e
the disinﬂation is abandoned, agents believe that the old policy is resumed and maintained
forever. In this section we consider agents’ beliefs to be ﬁxed, in the sense that the perceived
probability of abandonment over an interval of a given length is always the same. We relax
this assumption in Section 4.
13In the simple version of the model that we use in this paper to study an imperfectly credible disinﬂation,
the optimal time between pricing dates in the inﬂationary steady state is constant. More generally, however,
the optimal time interval until the next pricing date depends on the state of the economy on the current
pricing date (see Appendix B).
10Despite agents’ beliefs, the monetary authority never reneges on the promise to disinﬂate.
Therefore, after the stabilization policy is launched at t =0 , the actual process for nominal




where π0 is the targeted growth rate for nominal income, and where we introduce the nor-
malization Y0 =0 . We refer to the case of π0 =0as “full disinﬂation,” while 0 <π 0 <π
corresponds to a “partial disinﬂation.” We abstract from the details of the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy, and implicitly assume that the monetary authority sets its
policy instrument so as to generate the postulated disinﬂation path for nominal aggregate
demand.
In contrast, nominal aggregate demand according to agents’ beliefs, Yb









where Nt is a Poisson counting process with constant arrival rate h,a n d1 l{·} is the indicator
function. With this notation, Nt =0if the disinﬂation has been maintained up to time t,
and Nt ≥ 1 otherwise.
With this formulation we can interpret h as a measure of credibility, with high values
representing low credibility. The subjective probability that stabilization will last until time
t is given by e−ht.T h u s ,f o re x a m p l e ,i fh =0 .5 (at an annual rate), the subjective probability
that the stabilization will last more than one year is 61%. The polar cases of perfect and no
credibility correspond to h =0and h = ∞, respectively.
In general, solving for the optimal pricing rule requires solving an optimization and an
aggregation problem simultaneously: the optimal pricing rule depends on the expected path
for the aggregate price level and other aggregate variables, which in turn result from the
aggregation of agents’ behavior in equilibrium. However, if the optimal pricing problem can
be expressed solely as a function of exogenous variables, the optimization and aggregation
problems can be solved sequentially, in that order.
Our model economy satisﬁes that condition, due to the absence of strategic complemen-
tarity or substitutability in price setting, and of any other dependence of the optimal pricing
problem on endogenous variables.14 When making pricing decisions ﬁrms only care about the
14This follows from our assumptions on preferences and technology, which are spelled out in the Appendix.
11evolution of nominal aggregate demand, and therefore we can solve for the optimal pricing
rule independently of equilibrium considerations.15 Moreover, the fact that we model the
frictionless optimal price as a random walk, combined with the assumption that (eventual)
policy shifts involve instantaneous jumps between regimes, and that policy reversals arrive
according to a constant hazard process, simplify the pricing problem substantially.
The relevant state of the economy after the disinﬂation is launched can be summarized by
the Poisson counting process Nt, which indicates whether disinﬂation has been abandoned up
to time t (Nt ≥ 1)o rn o t( Nt =0 ). If a policy reversal has occurred before time t, the pricing
problem becomes identical to that of the original inﬂationary steady state. Otherwise, the
problem of a ﬁrm on a pricing date incorporates the possibility of the disinﬂation being














, if Nt =0
Vπ, if Nt ≥ 1,
(9)
where


































In (9), Gh (z,τ) is the expected cost due to deviations from the frictionless optimal price
during the next interval of length τ, starting with the discrepancy z. If a policy reversal
occurs in the near future (i.e. before t + τ), agents will account for it on their next pricing
date.16 Then, the new pricing decision will be made under conditions identical to the original
inﬂationary steady state. This results in the value function Vπ. In (10), the ﬁr s tl i n eo ft h e
expression refers to the subjective probability that the stabilization will be maintained during
the next interval of length τ multiplied by the cost in this case. The second line gives the cost
if abandonment occurs before the next pricing date. It considers each possible abandonment
time t+r, and adds the resulting costs weighted by the (subjective) likelihood of each event.
15The absence of interactions in pricing decisions is common in state-dependent pricing models, where
aggregation can be cumbersome (e.g. Caplin and Leahy 1991, Almeida and Bonomo 2002, and Golosov and
Lucas 2007). Caplin and Leahy (1997), and Gertler and Leahy (2006) are two noticeable exceptions.
16In Bonomo and Carvalho (2004), ﬁrms are allowed to reevaluate their pricing policies when the disin-
ﬂation is announced. This leads to important changes in the results for high - but not for low - inﬂation
environments. We conjecture that a similar conclusion obtains with respect to abandonment under imperfect
credibility, for the same reasons outlined in that paper.




































































From (6), (9), (10), (11) and (12) we obtain a nonlinear equation in τ∗
h,w h i c hc a nb e
solved numerically. Then, with τ∗
h we can compute z∗
h using (11).
Figure 1 shows the optimal time interval between pricing dates as a function of the level
of credibility in a full disinﬂation, for two levels of initial inﬂation (π =0 .1 and π =0 .2). It
shows that the lower the credibility is (the higher h), the shorter the duration of price spells
is. A lower level of credibility implies higher expected inﬂation, increasing the expected
proﬁtl o s sf r o mh a v i n gaﬁxed price for a spell of a given duration. Thus, if the duration
is unchanged the expected marginal loss at the next pricing date will exceed the expected
marginal beneﬁt of postponing the pricing date. This leads ﬁrms to reduce the time interval
between pricing dates in order to restore the balance between the marginal beneﬁt and cost
of postponing a price change.
3 Aggregate results
3.1 Aggregation methodology17
We assume that, prior to disinﬂation, pricing dates are distributed uniformly over time.
Having solved for the optimal pricing rule before and after the disinﬂation is announced, we
can compute the sequence of pricing dates chosen by ﬁrms that change prices at any given
time. Thus, to obtain the aggregate price level at any point in time after t =0 ,w ec a nt r a c e
back the last pricing date of all ﬁrms, and aggregate the corresponding prices.18
More formally, let g(·) be the function which gives the next pricing date: g(t)=t + τ∗
t,
where τ∗
t denotes the optimal spell chosen at time t.19 In order to calculate the aggregate
17This subsection builds on Bonomo and Carvalho (2004).
18Firms are subject to idiosyncratic shocks, and so even ﬁrms that share a pricing date will set diﬀerent
prices. However, because these diﬀerences cancel out, when aggregating we only have to account for the
component that is common to all ﬁrms that share a given pricing date.
19In the disinﬂation of the previous section, with ﬁxed beliefs, τ∗
t is constant and equal to τ∗
h. However,
this will no longer be the case under learning, in Section (4). Therefore we explain the aggregation method
13price level at an arbitrary time after the disinﬂation announcement, we use the function g to
relate the measure of ﬁrms which set their prices on a speciﬁcp r i c i n gd a t eu to the measure
of ﬁrms at times before u that would have chosen u as their next pricing date (those times
are g−1 (u)). For that purpose, let Γ(t) be the correspondence that assigns to t the set of
pricing dates when the current prices were chosen:
Γ(t)={t
0 : t
0 ≤ t and g(t
0) >t }. (13)
Let g−1 (S) be the inverse image of the set S under g. Then, g−1 (Γ(t)) is the set of
pricing dates for which the next pricing date would be in Γ(t). To evaluate the average price
at t we need to know the probability measure v of the ﬁrms which last adjusted at subsets
of Γ(t). We can easily relate this measure to the measure ϕ of subsets of g−1(Γ(t)),s i n c ev








where xr is the average price of ﬁrms which set prices at time r. We apply (14) recursively by
relating distributions and pricing dates during disinﬂation to preceding times. We proceed
in this way until we arrive at a set Γ−n (t) ≡ g−n (Γ(t)) such that the measure of ﬁrms
adjusting at the subset of pricing dates of Γ−n (t) corresponds to the uniform distribution of
the initial inﬂationary steady state.
We implement the aggregation algorithm just described computationally, as follows. We
discretize time so that one year has 1000 possible pricing dates. The optimal interval between
pricing dates obtained in the previous section is rounded accordingly, so that both the domain
and image of g coincide with the time grid. We set a ﬁnal date far enough for the transition
to the new steady state to be completed, and, given g,m o v ef o r w a r di nt i m et oﬁnd the
subset of dates in which some ﬁrms actually make pricing decisions.20 F o re a c hs u c hp r i c i n g
date, we construct the set deﬁned in (13), and aggregate ﬁrms’ prices according to (14). In
between pricing dates, the aggregate price level remains constant.
using a notation that can be applied to both cases.
20If the time interval between pricing dates remained constant despite the disinﬂation, any future time
would be a pricing date for some ﬁrms, given that we start from a uniformly staggered distribution of pricing
dates. This would simplify aggregation tremendously. However, because the optimal spell of price rigidity
changes after the disinﬂation, this is not the case in our model, and we need to keep track of when ﬁrms
choose to adjust.
143.2 Results
We start by illustrating why taking into account the optimality of pricing rules might be
relevant for assessing the direct eﬀect of imperfect credibility appropriately. In Figure 2,
we compare the output eﬀects of perfectly and imperfectly credible disinﬂations, ﬁxing the
same arbitrary duration of price spells for two diﬀerent initial inﬂation rates.21 It is apparent
that the direct eﬀect is more important for higher inﬂation rates. The reason is that, given
the same time interval between pricing dates, agents set higher prices because of the risk of
facing higher inﬂation in case the stabilization is abandoned before their next pricing date.
In Figure 3, on the other hand, the duration of price spells is ﬁxed at the optimal level for
each initial inﬂation rate. The relation between inﬂation and the direct eﬀect of imperfect
credibility is now unclear. The reason is that the spells of price rigidity are shorter for higher
initial inﬂation rates and so, despite the fact that inﬂation would be higher in the case of a
policy reversal, the probability that this event happens before the next pricing date is now
smaller.
These results illustrate the importance of the extent of price rigidity to the assessment
of the direct eﬀect of imperfect credibility. Therefore, in all of our subsequent experiments,
we ﬁx the duration of price spells under exogenous rules at the optimal level implied by
our model for the initial inﬂationary steady state. This is a suitable assumption for the
experiments we analyze, which are unexpected disinﬂations. We start from an inﬂationary
steady state which is expected to last, and so it makes sense to use spells of price rigidity
which are compatible with that steady state. This allows us to properly assess the indirect
eﬀect of imperfect credibility, by appropriately taking the direct eﬀect into account.
Figure 4 depicts the output eﬀects of a full disinﬂation with our baseline calibration
for two levels of credibility (h =0 .5,a n dh =2 ), with both endogenous and exogenous
pricing rules. The case of perfect credibility (h =0 ) is presented for comparison purposes.
As expected, with imperfect credibility the recession generated is larger. It is clear that
endogeneity of pricing rules reinforces this result. This happens because the time interval
between pricing dates increases after the disinﬂation begins, as ﬁrms optimally respond to
lower expected inﬂation. With perfect credibility, as shown in Bonomo and Carvalho (2004),
in the case of full disinﬂation and no strategic complementarity in price setting, the output
costs of disinﬂation are the same with endogenous or exogenous pricing rules. The reason
is that every ﬁrm that adjusts after the disinﬂation is announced knows that the aggregate
component of their frictionless optimal price will remain constant. Then, individual prices are
set taking into account only the idiosyncratic component of such optimal price, and the time
21Contract lengths are ﬁxed at the level corresponding to the optimum for π =3 % .
15interval between pricing dates has no aggregate impact. With imperfect credibility this result
ceases to be true, since agents attribute some probability that the monetary authority will
abandon the stabilization before their next pricing date, in which case inﬂation will resume.
With endogenous pricing rules, prices are optimally set for a longer interval when compared
with exogenous rules, which implies a higher (subjective) probability of abandonment before
the next pricing date. Therefore, prices are set at higher levels and the recession is larger.
This is a result of the interaction between imperfect credibility and the optimally chosen
frequency of repricing.
If credibility is lower, the duration of price spells increases less after the disinﬂation
is announced, and so the diﬀerences between endogenous and exogenous pricing rules are
attenuated. On the other hand, the diﬀerences relative to the case of perfect credibility are
ampliﬁed due to the direct eﬀect of imperfect credibility, as can be noted in Figure 4.
In Figure 5 we explore the role of idiosyncratic uncertainty. In the case of a perfectly
credible full disinﬂation, idiosyncratic shocks are required for the time interval between
pricing dates to be ﬁnite after the policy change. Otherwise, with zero inﬂation and no
uncertainty, there would be no reason to incur the cost to make pricing decisions. With
imperfect credibility, however, this is no longer the case, since the possibility of a policy
reversal leads ﬁrms to revisit their pricing decisions irrespective of idiosyncratic uncertainty.
The lower σ is, the more the frequency of price changes responds to inﬂation. So, when
σ =0the diﬀerences between endogenous and exogenous pricing rules are ampliﬁed. This
comparison is illustrated in Figure 5, against our benchmark value σ =3 % .
These results on the eﬀects of diﬀerent levels of credibility and idiosyncratic uncertainty
illustrate important general features of the interaction between imperfect credibility and the
optimal pricing rule, which also apply to the other results that we present. To avoid having
too many simulations, however, we illustrate them only through the previous experiments.
Ap a r t i a ld i s i n ﬂation presents some qualitative diﬀerences when compared to a full disin-
ﬂation. The reason is that, with nominal rigidity in individual prices, the expected discrep-
ancy while there is no individual price adjustment only remains constant when the inﬂation
drift is zero. So, in contrast with the full disinﬂation case, in a partial disinﬂation a longer
time interval between pricing dates will induce ﬁrms to set higher prices even with full
credibility. With partial disinﬂation and imperfect credibility, continuing inﬂation and the
probability of a policy reversal interact with the time interval between pricing dates, and
aﬀect pricing decisions. Given the optimally chosen longer spell of price rigidity, ﬁrms in-
corporate both the (higher) probability of abandonment and ongoing inﬂa t i o nw h e ns e t t i n g
their prices. As a consequence, the recession tends to be larger.
Figure 6 shows the result of a partial disinﬂation under imperfect credibility for both
16exogenous and endogenous pricing rules. As expected, the latter generate a larger recession,
but also output cycles. These cycles result from gaps in the new distribution of pricing
dates, which are generated by the sudden increase in the optimal time interval between
pricing decisions.22
4 Disinﬂa t i o nw i t hl e a r n i n g
The results analyzed so far correspond to a situation in which the monetary authority never
reneges on the announced disinﬂation, but nevertheless agents continue to believe that there
is always the same probability of a policy reversal. Thus, the recession continues indeﬁnitely,
which is clearly unrealistic.
This result arises from the conjunction of two assumptions: initial beliefs that do not
correspond to the true type of the monetary authority,23 and lack of updating of such beliefs
as disinﬂation evolves.
Discrepancies between agents’ beliefs and the actual type of the monetary authority
capture the essence of the problem faced by a monetary authority that is really serious
about disinﬂating, but has low credibility. Lack of updating of beliefs, on the other hand, is
clearly an extreme and unrealistic assumption, which we drop in this section.
We analyze how credibility evolves during disinﬂation, and how this interacts with optimal
price setting to determine the output costs of disinﬂation. Initially, all agents hold the same
beliefs about the type of the monetary authority that they face. After the disinﬂation is
launched, on every pricing date ﬁrms update their beliefs, taking into account whether or
not disinﬂation has been abandoned. Updating is done according to Bayes’ rule.
In the next subsection we present the framework with learning, and derive the optimal
pricing rule. We then specialize to the case of a monetary authority who is fully commit-
ted to disinﬂate, but initially lacks credibility. We compare the costs of disinﬂation under
endogenous and exogenous pricing rules.
4.1 Optimal pricing rule
We assume that there are two possible types for the monetary authority, characterized by
the constant hazard rate for the Poisson process according to which it reneges on the promise
to disinﬂate: h>h> 0. We assume that when the disinﬂation policy is launched at t =0 ,
22Note that those gaps also occur in the case of full disinﬂation. However, they cause no output oscillation
since on average ﬁrms keep their prices constant.
23In this section we interpret h as indexing the possible behavioral types that the monetary authority can
assume. For instance, a monetary authority that never reneges is of type h =0 .
17a g e n t sh a v et h es a m eb e l i e fa b o u tt h et y p eo fm o n e t a r ya u t h o r i t yt h e yf a c e .W ed e n o t eb y
µ the prior probability of the monetary authority being of type h.
At any time t>0, whenever ﬁrms incur the pricing cost to gather and process information
and make pricing decisions, they observe whether disinﬂation has been abandoned and,
conditional on no abandonment, form the posterior µt, according to Bayes’ rule:24
µt ≡ Pr{h = h|Nt =0 }
=
Pr{h = h,N t =0 }
Pr{h = h,N t =0 } +P r
©




µe−ht +( 1− µ)e−ht. (15)
Now the set of state variables for the pricing problem is augmented by the posterior
belief µt, given by (15). Given the parameters h, h and the initial belief µ, the posterior
is a function only of the time elapsed since disinﬂation was launched. If a policy reversal
has occurred before time t, the pricing problem becomes identical to that of the original
inﬂationary steady state. Otherwise, the problem of a ﬁrm on a pricing date incorporates
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⎦, if Nt =0
Vπ, if Nt ≥ 1.
(16)
We solve the above problem numerically, as described in Appendix C.
4.2 Results
We focus on the case of a monetary authority that is fully committed to disinﬂate (i.e., of
type h =0 ) but faces a credibility problem at the time of the policy change (h>0,µ<1).
Figure 7 presents the path for the optimal time interval between pricing dates during
af u l ld i s i n ﬂation. When the disinﬂation begins at t =0 , ﬁrms who are on a pricing date
choose to ﬁx prices for longer periods when compared to the inﬂationary steady state. The
24Agents also update their beliefs when they learn that the disinﬂation has been abandoned. However,
since we assume that in that case the previous inﬂationary steady state resumes irrespective of the true type
of the monetary authority, such beliefs become irrelevant.
18initial jump is a reaction to the announcement of the new policy, which lowers expected
inﬂation. As the disinﬂation evolves, the monetary authority gains credibility and ﬁrms who
make pricing decisions subsequently choose progressively longer spells of price rigidity. In
the limit, as t →∞ , agents end up believing that the monetary authority is actually not
going to renege, and so the optimal frequency of price changes approaches the new steady
state.
The paths for output under both endogenous and exogenous pricing rules are presented in
Figure 8. They share the general features of the full disinﬂation case without learning (Figure
4), with one noticeable exception: now, as credibility builds up, output reverts towards the
steady state level. Once more, the recession is larger under endogenous pricing rules.
The diﬀerences between those results and the ones for a full disinﬂation without learning
hinge on the process of updating of beliefs. According with our assumptions, on pricing dates
ﬁrms update their beliefs about the type of the monetary authority they face. Because ﬁrms
have diﬀerent pricing dates, at each point in time there is a distribution of beliefs among
price-setters, which can be represented by {µit}i∈[0,1],w h e r eµit ≡ Pr{h = h|Nti =0 },a n d
ti ≤ t represents ﬁrm i’s last pricing date.
We summarize the evolution of this distribution of beliefs during disinﬂation by its mean
(µt ≡
R 1




0 (µit − µt)
2 di), which we present in Figure
9. When the disinﬂation is launched all agents hold the same belief, given by the common
prior µ. As disinﬂation evolves, price-setters who undertake price revisions update their
beliefs µit upwards, and therefore the average belief µt increases, at the same time as σ
µ
t
starts to indicate dispersion in the corresponding distribution. This process continues for a
while, with beliefs becoming more dispersed as ﬁrms choose to reprice less often and make
decisions on diﬀerent pricing dates, until a point where the tendency reverts and beliefs start
to converge, albeit non-monotonically. Meanwhile, the average belief µt increases steadily
towards unity.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The role of credibility in monetary disinﬂations depends critically on the extent of price
rigidity. This paper evaluates the eﬀect of imperfect credibility of a disinﬂation policy in a
model in which the time period between individual price adjustments is chosen optimally
ex-ante. As a result we are able to evaluate both the direct eﬀect of credibility, for a
given frequency of price adjustments, and the indirect eﬀect, which is engendered by the
optimality of the pricing rule. The latter is important, as the eﬀects of imperfect credibility
and endogeneity of pricing rules interact to generate larger costs of disinﬂation. When the
19model is augmented with learning, it generates a realistic output pattern for the disinﬂation
process.
Those results are encouraging enough to justify further research, both theoretical and
empirical, based on endogenous time-dependent pricing rules. In empirical terms, an impor-
tant challenge is to ﬁnd ways to distinguish between diﬀerent price setting speciﬁcations.
Our results show that state- and endogenous time-dependent pricing models share many
similarities in terms of the behavior predicted at the microeconomic level. Yet, their aggre-
gate implications can diﬀer dramatically. In theoretical terms, from a normative perspective
our results point to the importance of analyzing the welfare implications of alternative dis-
inﬂation strategies under optimal pricing rules.
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23Appendix A
Here we derive the frictionless optimal price in a general equilibrium framework with
ﬁrm-speciﬁcs h o c k s .





−ρ(t−t0) [log(Ct) − Ht]dt,




















ΛrdDr, for t ≥ 0,











with θ>1,a n dw h e r eCit is the consumption of variety i, Pit is its price, Ht is the supply
of labor, which is remunerated at wage Wt,B t is total ﬁnancial wealth, Tt denotes total net
transfers, including any lump-sum ﬂow transfer from the government, and proﬁts received
from the ﬁrms, which are owned by the representative consumer. Qr is the vector of prices
of traded assets, Dr is the corresponding vector of cumulative dividend processes, and Λr is
the trading strategy, which we assume satisﬁes conditions that preclude Ponzi schemes. The


















Each ﬁrm hires labor to produce its variety of the consumption good according to the
following production function:
Yit = AitHit,
where Ait is ﬁrm i’s productivity process. It is decomposed as:
Ait =e x p{εit} =e x p{εt + ξit},
24where εt is the aggregate productivity component given by εt ≡
R 1
0 εitdi,a n dξit is the
ﬁrm-speciﬁcc o m p o n e n t . 25 We assume that ﬁrm-speciﬁcc o m p o n e n t sh a v et h es a m el a wo f
motion, and are mutually independent.
If producer i could adjust prices continuously, she would choose a price P∗
it to maximize










where Yt/Ait is the real marginal cost of producing Yit.W er e f e rt oP∗
it as ﬁrm i’s frictionless












w h e r ew em a d eu s eo ft h ef a c tt h a ti fﬁrm i had ﬂexible prices, the charged price Pit would












In this economy, a ﬂexible price equilibrium is the one that obtains when all prices are
ﬂexible, so that (20) holds for each i, with aggregate output Yt given by (21). The corre-
sponding level of aggregate output is what we refer to as the natural level of output, Y n
t .
This is similar to the standard concept in the literature (e.g. Woodford, 2003, chapter 3).
However, notice that here each individual output level in general diﬀers from Y n
t due to the
existence of ﬁrm-speciﬁcs h o c k s . 26
Proceeding analogously as in Woodford (2003), we deﬁne the deterministic steady state
level of production, Y ,a st h eo u t p u tl e v e li nt h es y m m e t r i cﬂexible price equilibrium when





In order to obtain a more explicit characterization of the ﬂexible price equilibrium we
loglinearize both sides of equation (20) around the deterministic steady state levels, and
25Note that our decomposition and the deﬁnition of εt imply that ξjt’s have zero mean in the cross-section
of ﬁrms.




→ Yjt. For a given realization








. For given realizations Ajt for all j, an equilibrium is a
ﬁxed point of {Θjt}j∈[0,1].
25rearrange to get:
yit =( 1− θ)yt + θεit, (22)










Loglinearizing (21), and using (22), we obtain a relation between natural output and the
aggregate level of productivity:
y
n
t = εt. (23)
To derive a relation between the frictionless optimal price for ﬁrm i and the output gap,
yt − yn
t ,n o t et h a t :
p
∗
it − pt =l o g
θ
θ − 1
+l o gYt − logAit
= −logY +l o gYt − εit
= yt − εit.




it − pt = yt − y
n
t + eit, (24)
where eit ≡− ξit.
Since our focus is on the supply side of the model, we take (log) nominal aggregate
demand Yt ≡ pt + yt to be an exogenous process. Substituting yt = Yt − pt into (24) we
arrive at the expression for the frictionless optimal price that we use in the main text:
p
∗
it = Yt − y
n
t + eit. (25)
Appendix B
Formally, the pricing problem of a ﬁrm may be written as:28


































so that e V (st0) denotes the attained present value of real proﬁts Π, net of pricing costs b F,




j=1 denotes the sequence of pricing dates
and nominal prices set at each of those dates.
27In what follows, lowercase variables denote log-deviations from the deterministic steady state.
28Initially we drop the i subscripts in order to simplify the notation.
26Let V ∗ (st0) denote the attained present value of proﬁts of an hypothetical identical ﬁrm



















t+r is the individual price that maximizes real proﬁts at time t+r, i.e. the frictionless
optimal price of the ﬁrm. With this auxiliary value function, b V (st0) ≡ V ∗ (st0) − e V (st0) is
the minimized present value of the real proﬁt losses due to the existence of pricing costs,
and our problem can be stated equivalently as one of minimizing the present value of such
losses:




















































to be the instantaneous real proﬁt
loss due to a “suboptimal” price Pi,w ec a nr e w r i t eb V as:































A recursive formulation to this minimization problem is given by the following Bellman
equation:



















b F + b V (st+τ)
´¸
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We can renormalize the pricing problem by Π and rewrite it as:


















F + V (st+τ)
¢¸
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Π , F ≡
e F
Π.
27Given the primitives for preferences and technology, the expression for ﬂow real proﬁts















where Pi is the price charged by ﬁrm i. We can use the labor supply equation for this
economy to express the real wage as a function of aggregate output (W
P = Y ), and rewrite










































































































































The ﬁrst ratio in (26) is the proportional proﬁt loss (relative to the level of proﬁts that
29Now we reintroduce the i subscript.
28would obtain if the ﬁrm had ﬂexible prices) due to the “suboptimal” price. It is convenient




























































































































































































































T h ep r e s e n c eo fa g g r e g a t eo u t p u ti nt h el o s sf u n c t i o ni m p l i e st h a ts o l v i n gf o rt h eo p t i m a l
pricing rule involves a ﬁxed point problem, even in the absence of strategic complementarity
29or substitutability in price setting. Furthermore, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc level of productivity should
introduce idiosyncratic variation in the optimal time interval between pricing dates.
We make the problem more tractable by abstracting from such idiosyncratic variation
(i.e. setting εit =0when deriving the optimal pricing rule), and assuming θ =2in order
to eliminate the eﬀect of aggregate output. Then, we take a second-order Taylor expansion
of ﬂow proﬁt losses around the path for the frictionless optimal price in order to obtain an
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2 , F ≡ F
2, and using the discrepancy zi ≡ xi − p∗
i,w e
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Equations (29), (30), and (16) characterize z∗
t, τ∗
t and Vµ (0,t+ τ∗
t).T o s o l v e t h i s s e t
of equations, we ﬁrst pick ¯ t large enough, such that, for t>¯ t, Vµ (0,t) can be taken as
approximately constant. This is justiﬁed: conditional on no abandonment, the probability
30that the monetary authority is of type h keeps increasing, and the problem becomes more
similar to the one analyzed in section (2.3), with h = h.F o r m a l l y ,lim
t→∞µt =1 ,30 which
implies that lim
t→∞Vµ (0,t)=Vh. So, we solve the set of equations moving backwards in time.
For each t we ﬁnd z∗
t, τ∗
t and use them to compute Vµ (0,t), which is then used to ﬁnd z∗,
τ∗ at earlier times. Alternatively, to avoid numerical derivatives, one can use (29), and (16)
to ﬁnd τ∗
t with a grid search, instead of using (30). This is the method we adopt.
30Just rewrite µt as 1
1+
(1−µ)
µ e−(h−h)t, and recall that h − h > 0.
31Figure 1
Figure 2
Obs: Duration of price spells are fixed at the model's implied optimal level for π=3%.




















































Direct effect - arbitrary duration


































































































Output - full disinflation, varying h






























































































Direct effect - optimal duration






























































































Output - partial disinflation








































































Output - full disinflation, varying σ 































































































Optimal duration under learning















Output - disinflation under learning
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